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Can Volunteer Forces Deter Great Power War? Evidence from
the Baltics
Abstract
Deterrence theory typically focuses on states’ armed forces and other tools of coercion.
However, what about the resolve, resilience, and willingness of ordinary civilians who
voluntarily organize and arm themselves as reservist militias to defend their homeland?
Can well-armed volunteers in smaller states deter larger powers? We examine the case of
the Baltic States and Russia, one of the central fault lines of global politics. Questioning the
commitment of NATO to their collective security, the governments of the Baltic States have
begun to actively arm, organize, recruit, and train thousands of volunteer reservists to
defend their homelands from an asymmetric attack, conventional or otherwise. Based on
fieldwork in the region, we find that informal volunteer forces and formal civilian militias
can influence the calculus of more powerful adversaries to produce a deterrent effect.
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Introduction
This article starts from a central premise that may sound obvious: Small
countries cannot compete militarily with larger powers.1 The common
maxim going back to the Melian Dialogue states, “the strong do what they
can, [and] the weak suffer what they must.” Yet, is this truly the case?
Going back to Roman times, smaller powers have armed their populations
and trained them in the art of small wars to both defend their borders and
deter attacks from larger powers. In the annuls of asymmetric warfare
there are ample cases of smaller militias militarily outlasting and even
defeating their larger state counterparts: In Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
throughout Latin America.2 Yet it is not clear if these forces help deter.
Can the presence of an armed populace, trained in small unit tactics, and
ready to fight an asymmetric war in the event of an attack hold deterrent
value? Put another way can a large volunteer force, even if it has no chance
of defeating a more powerful military, increase the perceived costs enough
to deter to stronger power from invading in the first place?
We examine the deterrent value of the Baltic States’ volunteers, which are
reserve units of volunteers modeled after their Scandinavian
counterparts.3 The aim of these forces is to deter Russian aggression, or
failing that, to make a Russian invasion or limited land grab, like Moscow’s
2014 annexation of Crimea, as expensive as possible and ultimately force
Russia to walk away in defeat as it did in Afghanistan. In the event of an
armed attack, these groups would adopt a total defense approach to
homeland security, conduct harassing and spoiler attacks during an initial
invasion and then transition into an insurgent force once the standing
military has been defeated or dissolved back into the population.4 In some
cases, it took a whole of society approach to arm and equip thousands of
ordinary citizens, training them in small-unit tactics, the handling of
explosives, and carrying out acts of subversion or diversionary tactics.5
Given the Baltics’ small size, this means working together, even as they
prepare to fight alone.6
While experts have debated the deterrent effect of NATO’s Operation
Atlantic Resolve and its Enhanced Forward Presence battalions that rotate
to the Baltics and Poland, they pay less attention to the deterrent value of
the Baltics’ volunteer battalions. This article aims to address this shortfall,
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finding that Baltic volunteer forces do appear to have a deterrent effect on
Russia.
This article proceeds as follows: First, we detail the logic of deterrence in
the context of volunteer forces. We then provide a brief overview of the
history of such volunteer brigades in the Baltics, discussing their
application and assessing their deterrent effect, as well as Russian
strategic options. We conclude with theoretical implications for
contemporary military operations and future deterrence in asymmetric
warfare.

Deterrence Theory, Hybrid War, and Volunteers
The present situation in the Baltic region is motivated as much by
historical animosity as it is by current geopolitical realities. A common
belief is that Russia, as a country (at the time, the Soviet Union) that
controlled them for much of the 20th century, poses an existential threat to
their territory. The Baltics want to avoid the same mistakes they made
after World War II, when, with the exception of small bands of armed
partisans, they did not resist the Soviets, which led to their decades-long
subjugation under Moscow’s rule.7 Baltic officials are also skeptical of the
assurance value of NATO, given their status as a buffer between Russia
and NATO. A popular phrase in the Baltics is, “If you’re not behind the
table, you’re on the menu.”8
Yet, the most likely threat to their security is not an armed invasion by
Russian forces, whereby Moscow sends in a column of mechanized
infantry across the border. The more likely threat is one of Russia
employing indirect hybrid means to unsettle these countries’ political
regimes, stir up ethnic minorities, or redraw sovereign borders similar to
what occurred in Crimea or in Ukraine’s east.9 While there is no agreed up
definition for hybrid warfare, it entails a “tailored mix of conventional,
irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational
battlespace” that is “aimed at achieving a political purpose.”10 Russia will
look to deploy its soft power in addition to its hard power, a strategy
sometimes referred to as new, or “next generation warfare.”11 This form of
warfare, Adamsky notes, “presumes the use of force, but it is, primarily, a
strategy of influence, not of brute force.”12
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Radin divides hybrid warfare into three actions: Nonviolent subversion,
covert violent actions, and conventional warfare supported by
subversion.13 The first two of these would not trigger Article 5 of NATO by
itself, thereby requiring a collective response from the alliance. They
purposefully fall below the threshold of an act of war, informing Russia’s
future way of warfare.”14 This includes protecting the rights of its
compatriots abroad, of which there are many throughout the Baltic States.
The questions this article asks: Are volunteer forces an effective enough
deterrent? If so, how and under what conditions?
Deterrence is a strategy states employ to exert pressure to prevent an
opponent from carrying out some action. By its definition, deterrence is
force held in reserve.15 Conventional deterrence theory focuses on several
factors, from threat perceptions, to decision-cycles, to the intentions of
one’s adversaries.16 It recognizes that a state must signal a perceived
commitment to the opponent, and presupposes that an opponent
possesses the political will to act or will resource the means to fight. Any
discussion of deterrence is premised on the conventional power to hurt
such that any offensive action will incur certain costs for the initiator.17
“[W]hen there is mutual fear,” as Thucydides noted, “men think twice
before they make aggressions upon one another.”18
In the context of the Baltics, however, the threat is one-sided and
asymmetric. Russia can hurt them but not vice versa. The strategic logic of
deterrence in this context is to deny the enemy battlefield success–to
create the perception, that should Russia invade, the population will not
sit back idly and watch, but instead they will take up arms in a long and
bloody fight.19 As some scholars note, this is how “big nations lose small
wars.”20 An occupation would look more like Moscow’s experience in
Afghanistan in the 1980s than its experience with the Baltics during the
Cold War.21
Drawing from recent fieldwork in the Baltic States and Ukraine, we cannot
definitively conclude that the presence of volunteer brigades influences the
calculus of larger opponents, but we can surmise the conditions under
which they are wielded most effectively. Put simply, we argue that militiatype units are less effective when it comes to deterring indirect hybrid
forms of warfare across other domains and may perversely even make
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such uses of force more likely due to a substitution effect. In addition,
while such reserve forces can signal resolve and thus deter a larger
opponent from an attack, the stakes must be high and the forces
sufficiently armed, sufficiently trained, and large enough to make the
signal credible.22 While deterrence is being reassessed in the context of
other domains such as cyber and information operations, there has been
little scholarly attention paid to the deterrent effect of volunteer selfdefense forces and opponents’ decisions to declare war or use force.

Volunteer Reserves and Deterrence Theory
The literature tends to focus on deterrence as a behavioral alteration to
avoid some future punishment.23 Deterrence, Schelling noted, “rests today
on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on the threat of military
defeat.”24 The central logic of holding a strategic reserve of volunteer
forces is to provide states the ability to deny an enemy battlefield gains at
the operational and tactical level. There are parallels to deterrence theory
in cyber space, where the strategy is also one of denial and the domain
perceived to be offense-dominant. “By chewing up the attacker’s resources
and time,” Nye writes, “a potential target disrupts the cost-benefit model
that creates an incentive for attack.”25
Effective deterrence relies broadly on three components: Capability,
resolve, and signaling.26 A state must possess some material capability, or
“power to hurt.”27 There is a cost with administering any capability, so the
target as being willing to incur the cost of the action must view the
deterring state.28 Deterrence also depends on a country’s credibility to
follow through on the threat to inflict harm on an opponent. An actor’s
reputation for resolve determines its credibility.29 Credibility is also a
function of the stakes involved. For the Baltics, given their size, any
invasion or land grab by a larger power would constitute an existential
crisis.
A third component of effective deterrence is signaling. Deterrence is in the
eye of the adversary. A credible threat must be communicated to and
received by the intended target. Because deterrence is about manipulating
another actor’s cost-benefit analysis and behavior, it requires that an
opponent be sufficiently motivated not to take an action, kinetic or
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otherwise, it otherwise would have, for fear of incurring casualties or
fighting a sustained war.
With hybrid warfare, such cost-benefit calculations become more
complicated. New domains are expanding traditional definitions of what
constitutes a battlespace.30 While the barriers of entry in this new space
are lower, it remains unclear if smaller states hold comparative advantages
and likewise whether states are capable of deterrence in this space.
Deterrence hinges on what types of attacks a state seeks to prevent. In the
case of the Baltics, the aim is to prevent their countries from being carved
up by military force, similar to Ukraine, yet they also seek to deter limited
attacks, threats, land grabs, provocations, applications of Russian soft
power, and other violations of their sovereignty. There are parallels to the
literature on cyber deterrence, as Nye notes, insofar as the goal is not only
to deter a “cyber Pearl Harbor” but also the countless attacks that occur
daily from non-state or proxy actors.31

How Weaker States Deter Ones That are More Powerful
Although a nation may be weaker militarily, it can still win because of an
asymmetry when it comes to resolve. There are many recent examples of
more powerful nations losing to weaker ones. The Soviets pulled out of
Afghanistan in February 1989 after nine years of war. The United States
left Vietnam in January 1973 after nearly a decade of war. Finally, the
United States was on the verge of exiting Iraq in 2007 prior to President
Bush committing to the surge. Andrew Mack argues that big nations lose
small wars due to the asymmetry of the conflict, which favors the
insurgent. Since its survival is at stake, it is a total war for the weaker
state; thus, its resolve to continue fighting, no matter the costs, is
extremely high. By contrast, for the invading nation, the war does not pose
a direct, existential threat, so it is a much more limited conflict; if the costs
are high enough, it may tire and leave. Cassidy points to the paradox of
great power conflict with asymmetric actors and finds that stronger states
lose because they embrace a “big war paradigm.”32
Others argue that relative power does not predict relative interest. What
matters, according to Arreguín-Toft, is the strategic interaction of the two
opposing sides.33 Both theories agree that time should favor the weaker
side. Admittedly, these theories tend to explain losses in expeditionary
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counterinsurgencies, but even if a conflict were to start as an interstate one
between conventional forces, it becomes an intrastate conflict between
insurgents and counterinsurgents after the initial victory. The United
States experienced this situation in Iraq in 2003.34
Despite the higher stakes for the smaller power, however, can the presence
of volunteer forces deter? There is some historical evidence of civilian
defense units held in reserve used for deterrence purposes. Stephen
Halbrook argues that it was Swiss determination to defend itself by raising
an armed force of volunteers that maintained its armed neutrality during
World War II, allowing it to ward off Germany’s armies from invading.35
Finland’s reserve force of some 350,000 personnel, all focused on
territorial defense, deterred a land invasion by the Soviets for half a
century across their shared 1,200-kilometer border.36
More recently, Iran has adopted what policy analyst Michael Connell calls
a “deterrence-based model of attrition warfare that raises an opponent’s
risks and costs, rather than reducing its own.”37 Learning from the United
States’ struggles in Iraq and Israel’s struggles against Hezbollah in 2006,
and realizing it has “little chance of winning a force-on-force conflict” with
the United States, Tehran adopted a doctrine that “play[s] to Iran’s
strengths, including geography, strategic depth, and public willingness to
accept casualties.”38 Its mosaic defense relies on the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and its paramilitary volunteer force, the Basij, to
conduct an insurgency against any invader. In other words, the weaker
nation need not convince the stronger power that it would win a war, all it
must do is communicate that the war would be too costly in the long run,
thus, deterring the stronger power from invading in the first place.39

The Baltics Case Study
It is therefore reasonable to believe that the findings from this literature
would apply to a Russian invasion of the Baltics. Even if Russian leaders
are ignorant of this literature, it is difficult to imagine that they will forget
their own experience in Afghanistan or the United States’ recent
experience in Iraq. Given their flat topography and lack of strategic depth,
however, the Baltic States are especially vulnerable to a conventional land
attack. Russian anti-aircraft missiles cover their airspace; they share a long
and vulnerable border with Russia’s ally, Belarus, to the southeast, and a
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border with Kaliningrad, Russia’s heavily armed exclave, to the west. 40
Recent provocations by Russian forces have occurred by land, sea, and air.
Yet, a growing concern is that Russia will apply unconventional, or hybrid,
means of warfare against the Baltic States: An oft-cited scenario is that
Russian operatives will seek to stir up popular unrest among their
Russian-speaking populations, as it has in Ukraine’s Donbas. Another fear
is a sophisticated cyberattack, like the one that crippled Estonia’s
government in 2007.
Hence, Baltic leaders agree on the need to be vigilant–security forces in
Estonia and Latvia are trained to shoot Russian “little green men”–as well
as arm a large reservist component of their population.41 There is a long
history of armed volunteerism in the region. During the waning years of
World War I, eight regiments of roughly 30,000 Latvian volunteers and
ex-soldiers, the so-called Latvian Riflemen, took up arms to expel their
German occupiers and lent support to the Red Army.42 These forces were
not motivated by pro-Bolshevik or Marxist sympathies but by Latvian
ethnic nationalism. What mattered was that the Bolsheviks promised them
peace and not to annex the Baltics. The Riflemen fought admirably, even
earning a spot as Lenin’s Praetorian Guard, before the movement would
later splinter between factions that were pro-Russian and anti-Russian.
The bulk of the Riflemen returned home from Russia disillusioned by the
Soviet experiment, feelings that would linger and define subsequent
generations of Latvian patriotism.43
During and after World War II, the Forest Brothers were a band of some
20,000-plus Baltic partisans who waged a guerrilla war against the Soviet
occupiers.44 These militias took on a mythological quality in Estonian
folklore. As resistance fighters, they would recede into the woods, and then
engage in hit-and-run tactics against a stronger enemy. Tired from the
fighting of World War II, and after government purges that sent thousands
of capable fighters to gulags, ultimately the rest of the Baltic population
lacked the capability and/or the resolve to mount any significant
resistance to their Russian occupiers. Many citizens and elected officials in
the Baltic States worry about a repeat of this era of occupation today.
While most of the world believes that World War II ended in 1945, many
Baltic citizens view the end of the war as 1991, when they finally won
independence from the Soviet Union.45
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A common refrain heard in the Baltics is, “We failed to fight them then, so
we must be prepared to fight them now.” The spirit of this grassroots
resistance, according to Baltic defense officials, aims to increase the
population’s resilience, strengthening the people’s sense of civic duty, and
presenting a united front across the Baltics. Put otherwise, to mobilize
their populations, the Baltic States are investing in hardware (arms,
training) and software (education, patriotism).

Capabilities: Military Hardware
While members of NATO, the Baltic States fear that the organization
might not come to their defense should Russia decide to invade.46 Even
though NATO has deployed four multinational battalions to the Baltic
States and Poland as a tripwire to deter a limited Russian incursion, in a
2016 war-gaming exercise, RAND found that Russian forces could seize
any of the three Baltic capitals within 36-60 hours.47 Much like the 2014
operation in Crimea, locals fear any attack would be a fait accompli: Russia
could occupy any of the Baltic States before NATO could reinforce. 48 As
opposed to defending the sovereign territory of a nation, it would instead
require an invasion to retake occupied territory, and it is far from clear
that NATO would go to war with a nuclear-armed state to retake the
territory.
Competing directly against the Russians is a daunting task. Russia’s
military expenditure is over 35 times the military expenditure of all three
Baltic States combined, as shown in table 1. Thus, even doubling the
percent of GDP allocated to military expenditures would have only a minor
effect on this disparity in military capability. Moreover, with a combined
population of about 6.2 million, the Baltic States are miniscule compared
to Russia. Their ability to project power is also limited, given that their
combined armed forces comprise just 22,000 troops (not including
reservists), 450 artillery pieces, no tanks, and virtually no air force.49 By
comparison, Russia boasts some 845,000 troops, with 15,000 tanks,
27,000 armored fighting vehicles, 6,000 artillery pieces, 3,000 aircraft,
and 973 helicopters.50
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Table 1: 2017 Military Expenditures
Country/ Alliance
NATO
United States
Russia
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia

GDP
($Millions)
$38,195,890
$19,390,604
$1,577,524
$47,168
$30,264
$25,291

Military
Expenditure
(Millions $)
$900,319
$609,758
$66,335
$811
$513
$536

Military
Expenditure
%GDP

Military
Expenditure as
% RU

2.3%
3.1%
4.3%
1.7%
1.7%
3.1%

1,357%
919%
N/A
1.22%
0.77%
0.81%

Source: Data comes from The World Bank and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute.51

Weaker states must demonstrate the capability to either inflict
considerable harm against Russia to effectively deter or be willing to fight
a sustained insurgency. Table 1 helps illustrate the motivation for the
Baltic States’ entry into NATO. Without significant outside support, it
would be extremely difficult, and likely impossible, for any of Russia’s
eastern neighbors to defeat Russia in a conventional fight.

Strategies for Weaker Powers
So how can smaller nations hope to deter a larger adversary? For Baltic
officials, NATO remains inherently unreliable because any member’s
security is dependent on other members coming to its defense. Beyond
collective action issues, there are deep philosophical and political divisions
among members over defense priorities. The Baltics must therefore hedge,
investing in both an external and internal balancing strategies. However, a
large-standing military is expensive to maintain. By one estimate, the
average cost (direct and indirect) of a NATO soldier is $300,000.52 While
this estimate may be high, even at a cost of $150,000 per soldier, a
battalion of 500 soldiers would cost $75 million, or over ten percent of the
military budget of any Baltic State. Thus, significant growth to a large
standing Army is not feasible.

Scenarios
Baltic officials put forth three scenarios of a conventional ground invasion
by Russia: First, Russian forces could drive into one of their capitals,
utilizing speed, stealth, and surprise to seize territory before NATO can
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respond. Second, Russia might seek to use conventional or proxy forces to
seize a city like Narva (a city along the Estonia-Russia border heavily
populated with Russians). Third, Russia may look to its military to create
land bridge linking Belarus to Kaliningrad across the strategically critical
Suwalki Gap.53
Russia’s recent military investments only exacerbate Baltic concerns. In
October 2018, satellite imagery showed Russian forces upgrading four of
their military installations in Kaliningrad, an exclave 300 miles west of
Russia’s mainland.54 Earlier in the year, aerial images indicated that the
Russians were modernizing a nuclear storage bunker there as well. They
showed the construction of 40 new bunkers, which would boost the
military storage capacity at Moscow’s second largest Baltic Sea port.
Satellites have also shown advanced upgrades of Chernyakhovsk (in
Kaliningrad), which houses Russia’s 152nd Missile Brigade. A U.S. defense
official told CNN it was “the biggest move we’ve seen” when it comes to
Russian militarization of the Baltic region. Establishing a land bridge,
replete with modern weaponry (anti-ship missiles, radar systems, surfaceto-air missiles) there would help Russia establish “anti-access/areadenial” (A2/AD) capabilities, reducing NATO’s ability to maneuver. 55
James Stavridis, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, notes that Kaliningrad
“functions as a sort of forward operating base behind NATO’s front lines.”
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare is perhaps the most likely type of force and
most difficult to deter.56 This could include instigating a separatist revolt,
sending “little green men into Narva,” or in Latgale, the eastern region of
Latvia, organizing acts of sabotage, carrying out cyberattacks, engaging in
disinformation campaigns targeting Russian speakers in the region, or a
combination of any of these.57 The attraction of this type of attack is it
provides Russia with plausible deniability, is cost-effective, and
presumably would not trigger NATO’s Article 5.

The Baltic Response
To deter the scenarios outlined above, the Baltic States are civilian
volunteers are being recruited, trained, and armed to defend their
homelands in the event of a Russian attack like Moscow’s 2014 annexation
of Crimea. As discussed, deterrence is difficult to prove because it requires
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on circumstantial evidence and the absence of some event or behavior. To
determine its effectiveness, the threat of future pain or costs must be
credible, and that the target changed its behavior because of such calculus,
and that absent the specified act of deterrence, an attack would have
occurred. One way to measure that is to examine how an opponent
structures and trains its forces–if the presence of volunteers is altering
one’s military strategy, a target will presumably rehearse for such
conditions. Second, deterrence could have difficult-to-detect substitution
effects. That is, effective deterrence may not lead to war’s absence but may
introduce alternative forms of warfare.
Estonia
Estonia espouses a total defense approach that emphasizes readiness and
resilience, encompassing all elements of society, government, and private
sector. 58 A state of fewer than 1.5 million inhabitants, many of them well
educated and tech-savvy, Estonia is remarkably advanced in its cyberdeterrence capabilities.59 Yet, Estonia remains arguably vulnerable to
Russian information operations, despite its Russian speakers being better
integrated than those in Latvia. Even still, Estonia has taken measures to
reduce Russian influence. In September 2015, it launched ETV+, its first
state-sponsored all-Russian language TV channel.60
Estonia’s standing army numbers only 6,400, half of whom are
professional soldiers and the other half conscripts, but a 26,000-strong
Estonian Defense League (EDL) and 60,000 reservists reinforce it.61 At the
heart of the EDL’s military focus is this question of expeditionary versus
territorial defense.62 With an annual budget of $40 million, the League
sponsors 24-hour competitions that test skills, such as constructing
improvised explosive devices to employ against an occupying Army. The
Defense League encourages its members to stockpile weapons at home as a
further deterrent.63
Every village in this ex-Soviet country with a population of 1.3 million
fields active EDL members, who participate in a minimum of 48 hours of
drill practice annually. They are trained in explosives, to carry out
mobilization and readiness exercises, learn the arts of subversion and
diversionary acts, and schooled on how to respond to little green men, in
the event of a cross-border incursion.64 Citizens are also encouraged to
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horde canned goods, warm clothes, and boots, should there be a long
occupation.65
Lithuania
Lithuania has codified its philosophy of civil resistance to mobilize its
people to take up arms after an attack, emphasizing counter-propaganda
via its use of offensive means to deter Russian information operations, and
credibly signaling its willingness to fight.66 It recently sought to bolster its
territorial defense by reintroducing conscription. The idea is to both deter
Russian aggression and provide an early defense effort until NATO can
come to Lithuania’s rescue. After Russia’s military buildup in Kaliningrad
in 2016-2017, Lithuania also announced it would build an 80-mile border
fence.67
Lithuania has taken a slightly different approach from Estonia, one
inspired more by Scandinavia. A National Defense Volunteer Force of
4,900, consisting of 4,200 “high-readiness part-time volunteer reserve
soldiers” and 700 professional soldiers, and an 8,000-strong Riflemen’s
Union, supports its regular army, which totals 8,100 soldiers.68 Volunteer
forces have also supported their Ukrainian counterparts fighting Russian
forces in the Donbas.69 Lithuanian citizens view World War II as ending in
1991, when the Soviet occupation ended.70 Lithuania’s constitution
stipulates that each citizen has the right to resist foreign invasion by force.
To reinforce this concept, Lithuania has published three manuals for its
citizenry. The first, How to Act in Extreme Situations or Instance of War,
was published in 2014 soon after Russia annexed Crimea. It provides
instructions on how to conduct civil disobedience against an occupying
enemy. In 2015, it published Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War: A
cheerful Take on Serious Recommendations.71 In 2016, it published a 75page manual, Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War, to instruct citizens
what to do if invaded, providing detailed images of Russian equipment (for
intelligence purposes), as well as instructions for administering first aid
and surviving in the wild. The government posted the manual online and
distributed 30,000 copies in schools and libraries.72
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Latvia
Latvia aims to make its population more resilient by training in small unit
tactics, building stronger patriotism and the will of the people, and seeking
greater mobility of forces to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver.
Latvia’s standing army totals 5,500 with a national guard organized
geographically to defend the land where they normally live, providing it an
extra “home field advantage.”73 These forces still only number 8,000, so
they offer a much lower deterrent value than the 86,000 reservists and
Defense Leaguers in Estonia or Lithuania’s entire population. Latvia has
also augmented its offensive capabilities–Special Forces and airborne
units––to deter Russian aggression.74
A key component of Russian military efforts in Latvia is deception, which
involve sophisticated information operations (IO) to sow distrust among
locals, which includes hundreds of thousands of native Russian speakers,
who watch Russian television. The Russian narrative emphasizes that
Latvia is a failed state, fascism is on the rise, the state is suppressing
Russian speakers here, Riga has no foreign policy independent of NATO’s
or the EU’s, and that Latvia will become a target of NATO. To counter
Russian disinformation, as well as to boost Latvian civic nationalism, all
the public schools will only use the Latvian language, a strategy that could
backfire if it alienates its Russian speakers.75

Is Deterrence Working?
Again, it is impossible to determine conclusively if volunteer forces are
working to deter. For these forces to deter, they must be powerful enough,
possess the necessary resolve, and the signal is credible.76 Yet, one
measure of effectiveness is to see if the Baltic’s investment in militias has
caused Moscow to change its behavior. We noted previously that the
simple absence of war is insufficient proof of deterrence. Rather it requires
evidence of Russian leaders changing their rational cost-benefit analysis,
force posture, or doctrine. In addition to evidence supporting a change, we
further note evidence of a substitution effect: Namely, that Russia may
choose to employ indirect or hybrid means in lieu of conventional tactics.
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There are also questions of Russian material capabilities and defense
spending priorities. In absolute terms, Moscow is spending less on defense
than in previous years.77 The size of Russia’s conventional military is
barely one-fifth of what it was during the height of the Cold War, when it
was half of government expenditures.78 Yet Moscow has boosted its
military modernization, updating its mechanized weaponry like the T-72
tank, all while paying off its defense sector debts (which have seen an 8
percent decline since 2016).79 While unlikely such defense expenditures
and modernization are directly in response to Baltic volunteer forces, there
is, evidence Russia feels less secure because of these forces and changing
its behavior.
Consider how Russia trains its military. Russia’s September 2017 Zapad
exercises focused on a “conventional enemy,” yet also featured defensive
tactical anti-terrorist exercises designed to repel smaller lightly equipped
and highly mobile units and “illegal armed groups” from the mythic
country of Veshnoriya, from engaging in armed incursions and
“penetrating” into Belarusian territory.80

Conclusion
Despite collective action mechanisms put in place by NATO to deter
Russian aggression, such as the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)
mission, this article focused on indigenous efforts by the Baltic States to
deter Russia from carrying out land grabs and other provocative actions,
particularly through the development of volunteer forces.81 We examined
the conditions under which such forces can deter larger adversaries, and
find that they must be well trained, possess the will to fight, and that the
signal is credible and conveyed to a would-be aggressor. These forces are
attractive to smaller powers. While the case highlights the dynamics by
which a smaller power can deter a stronger adversary from a ground
attack, however, an opponent may shift toward hybrid or indirect means of
warfare, including cyber or information operations.
In sum, deterrence going forward will not only come from NATO’s Article
5 or its EFP battalions. It will come from the popular will of thousands of
volunteers to raise the cost of invasion and deny the enemy battlefield
success, to avoid an unprovoked land grab like the 2014 annexation of
Crimea from taking place in the Baltics. To that end, NATO should allow
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the Baltic States to remodel their force structures to provide territorial
defense and credible deterrence adequately. The aim of these armed
volunteers is to deny the enemy the ability to operate freely, to create the
expectation of a long and bloody fight, and to inflict maximum damage on
an opponent whose willingness to fight may waver. Given the inherent
complexities of proving deterrence, further research is recommended.
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